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Abstract
In ASPIC-style structured argumentation an argument can rebut another argument
by attacking its conclusion. Two ways of formalizing rebuttal have been proposed:
In restricted rebuttal, the attacked conclusion must have been arrived at with a
defeasible rule, whereas in unrestricted rebuttal, it may have been arrived at with a
strict rule, as long as at least one of the antecedents of this strict rule was already
defeasible. One systematic way of choosing between various possible definitions
of a framework for structured argumentation is to study what rationality postulates
are satisfied by which definition, for example whether the closure postulate holds,
i.e. whether the accepted conclusions are closed under strict rules. While having
some benefits, the proposal to use unrestricted rebuttal faces the problem that
the closure postulate only holds for the grounded semantics but fails when other
argumentation semantics are applied, whereas with restricted rebuttal the closure
postulate always holds. In this paper we propose that ASPIC-style argumentation
can benefit from keeping track not only of the attack relation between arguments,
but also the relation of deductive joint support that holds between a set of arguments
and an argument that was constructed from that set using a strict rule. By taking
this deductive joint support relation into account while determining the extensions,
the closure postulate holds with unrestricted rebuttal under all admissibility-based
semantics. We define the semantics of deductive joint support through the flattening
method.
1 Introduction
Formal argumentation has become a fruitful field of researchwithin AI [15]. It comprises
twomain branches: Abstract argumentation is based on the idea promoted byDung [10]
that under some conditions, the acceptance of arguments depends only on the attack
relation between the arguments, i.e. on the relation that holds between a counterargument
and the argument that it counters. This idea gives rise to the notion of an argumentation
framework (AF), a directed graph whose nodes represent arguments and whose edges
represent the attack relations between them, as well as to the notion of an argumentation
semantics, a way of choosing accepted arguments from an argumentation framework.
Structured argumentation, on the other hand, studies the internal structure of arguments
that are constructed in some logical language and specifies how this internal structure
determines the attack relation between the arguments. Once the attack relation has been
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specified, the argumentation semantics from abstract argumentation can be applied to
determine the acceptability of arguments.
One important approach within structured argumentation is that of ASPIC-style
frameworks like ASPIC+ [12] and ASPIC− [4], in which arguments are constructed
by applying strict and defeasible rules to strict and defeasible premises. In these
ASPIC-style frameworks one can distinguish various kinds of attacks depending on
which part of an argument gets questioned. One kind of attack is a rebuttal, in which
one argument attacks the conclusion of another argument. Two ways of formalizing
rebuttal have been proposed: ASPIC+ makes use of restricted rebuttal, in which the
attacked conclusion must have been arrived at with a defeasible rule, whereas ASPIC−
makes use of unrestricted rebuttal, in which the attacked conclusion may have been
arrived at with a strict rule, as long as at least one of the antecedents of this strict rule
was already defeasible.
One systematic way of choosing between various possible definitions of a framework
for structured argumentation is to study what rationality postulates are satisfied by
which definition [2]. One example of such a rationality postulate is the closure postulate,
according to which the accepted conclusions should be closed under strict rules, i.e.
a statement that is derivable by applying a strict rule to some accepted conclusion
should itself be an accepted conclusion. For all admissibility-based argumentation
semantics, e.g. grounded, complete, stable or preferred semantics, ASPIC+ satisfies the
closure postulate. ASPIC− on the other hand only satisfies closure under the grounded
semantics, but fails to do so for the others, such as the preferred semantics. This failure
of the closure postulate is due to the use of unrestricted rebuttal. On the other hand,
from the point of view of human argumentation, unrestricted rebuttal seems to be a
very natural way of attacking an argument. This intuition has also been underpinned
through an empirical study of human evaluation of arguments [17].
In this paper we propose a modification to ASPIC−, calledDeductive ASPIC−, that
ensures that the closure postulate is satisfied under all admissibility-based argumentation
semantics. The underlying idea is to keep track not only of the attack relation between
arguments, but also the relation of deductive joint support that holds between a set
of arguments and an argument that was constructed from that set using a strict rule.
For this purpose, we introduce the notion of a Joint Support Bipolar Argumentation
Framework (JSBAF), which contains an attack relation like usual AFs and additionally
a joint support relation, whose intuitive interpretation is a deductive support from
the supporting arguments towards the supported arguments due to the latter being
constructed by applying a strict rule to the former. We show how existing argumentation
semantics for AFs can be adapted to semantics for JSBAFs using the flattening method.
We prove that the resulting framework for structured argumentation satisfies closure
as well as two other important rationality postulates, direct consistency and indirect
consistency.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains required preliminaries from
abstract and structured argumentation. In Section 3 we define JSBAFs and show how
existing argumentation semantics for AFs can be adapted to semantics for JSBAFs
using the flattening method. In Section 4 we define Deductive ASPIC−, prove that it
satisfies the closure postulate and the two consistency postulates, and finally illustrate
the functioning of Deductive ASPIC− by adapting Caminada’s tandem example [2] to
Deductive ASPIC−. Section 5 concludes the paper and presents avenues for further
research.
2 PRELIMINARIES OF ABSTRACT AND STRUCTURED ARGUMENTATION
2 Preliminaries of Abstract and Structured Argumentation
This section briefly presents some required preliminaries of abstract and structured
argumentation, startingwith the notion of an argumentation framework due to Dung [10].
Definition 2.1. An argumentation framework (AF) F = (Ar,→) is a finite directed
graph in which the set Ar of vertices is considered to represent arguments and the set
→⊆ Ar×Ar of edges is considered to represent the attack relation between arguments,
i.e. the relation between a counterargument and the argument that it counters.
Given an argumentation framework, we want to choose sets of arguments for which
it is rational and coherent to accept them together. Such a set of arguments that may be
accepted together is called an extension. Multiple argumentation semantics have been
defined in the literature, i.e. multiple different ways of defining extensions given an
argumentation framework. Before we consider specific argumentation semantics, we
first give a formal definition of the notion of argumentation semantics:
Definition 2.2. An argumentation semantics is a functionσ that maps anyAF F = (Ar,→)
to a set σ(F)⊆ 2Ar. The elements of σ(F) are called σ -extensions of F .
In this paper we consider the complete, stable, grounded and preferred semantics:
Definition 2.3. Let F =(Ar,→) be an AF, and let S⊆Ar. The set S is called conflict-free
iff there are no arguments b,c ∈ S such that b attacks c (i.e. such that (b,c) ∈→).
Argument a ∈ Ar is defended by S iff for every b ∈ Ar such that b attacks a there exists
c ∈ S such that c attacks b. We say that S is admissible iff S is conflict-free and every
argument in S is defended by S.
• S is a complete extension of F iff S is admissible and S contains all the arguments
it defends.
• S is a stable extension of F iff S is admissible and S attacks all arguments in
Ar\ S.
• S is the grounded extension of F iff S is the minimal (with respect to set inclusion)
complete extension of F .
• S is a preferred extension of F iff S is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion)
complete extension of F .
All of these four semantics satisfy the property that every extension is an admissible
set. Due to this property they are called admissibility-based semantics.
We now turn towards the definition of ASPIC−, a framework for structured argumentation
introduced by [4].
Definition 2.4. Given a logical languageL that is closed under negation (¬), an argumentation
system over L is a tuple AS= (Rs,Rd ,n) where:
• Rs is a finite set of strict inference rules of the form ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn → ϕ where ϕi,ϕ
are elements in L and n≥ 0.
• Rd is a finite set of defeasible inference rules of the form ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ⇒ ϕ where
ϕi,ϕ are elements in L and n≥ 0.
• n is a partial function such that n : Rd → L.
Definition 2.5. Let ϕ and ψ be formulas. ϕ =−ψ means that ϕ = ¬ψ or ψ = ¬ϕ .
Definition 2.6. An argument A on the basis of an argumentation system AS = (Rs,Rd ,n)
is defined recursively as follows:
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• A1, . . . ,An → ψ is an argument if A1, . . . ,An(n≥ 0) are arguments, and there is a
strict rule r =Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An)→ ψ in Rs. In that case De fRules(A) :=
De fRules(A1)∪ . . .∪De fRules(An).
• A1, . . . ,An ⇒ ψ is an argument if A1, . . . ,An(n≥ 0) are arguments, and there is a
defeasible rule r=Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An)⇒ψ in Rd . In that caseDe fRules(A) :=
De fRules(A1)∪ . . .∪De fRules(An)∪{r}.
In both cases we define Conc(A) := ψ , Sub(A) := Sub(A1)∪ . . .∪ Sub(An)∪{A} and
TopRule(A) := r. Furthermore, we call an argument A strict iff De fRules(A) = /0.
Definition 2.7. An argumentation system AS is called consistent iff there are no strict
arguments A,B on the basis of AS such thatConc(A) =−Conc(B).
Definition 2.8. Let A and B be arguments on the basis of an argumentation system
AS= (Rs,Rd ,n). We say that A undercuts B (on B
′) iff Conc(A) = −n(r) for some
B′ ∈ Sub(B) with TopRule(B′) = r and r ∈ Rd . We say that A unrestrictedly rebuts B
(on B′) iffConc(A) =−Conc(B′) for some strict B′ ∈ Sub(B).
Definition 2.9. Let AS= (Rs,Rd ,n) be an argumentation system. The argumentation
framework corresponding to AS according to ASPIC−, denoted by FASPIC−(AS), is
the AF (Ar,→), where Ar is the set of arguments on the basis of AS and A→ B holds
whenever A undercuts or unrestrictedly rebuts B.
Definition 2.10. Let AS= (Rs,Rd ,n) be an argumentation system and let σ be an
argumentation semantics. For every σ -extension E of FASPIC−(AS), the set {Conc(A) |
A ∈ E} is called a set of ASPIC− conclusions of AS under σ .
This concludes the definition of the structured argumentation framework ASPIC−.
Finally we define three rationality postulates due to Caminada and Amgoud [3] that
structured argumentation frameworks should ideally satisfy.
Definition 2.11. Let L be a logical language, let AS= (Rs,Rd ,n) be an argumenation
system over L, and let S ⊆ L. The closure of S under strict rules, denoted ClRs(S), is
the set S∪{b ∈ L | for some a1, . . . ,an ∈ S, there is a strict rule a1, . . . ,an → b ∈ Rs}.
Definition 2.12. Let F be a structured argumentation framework and let σ be an
argumentation semantics.
• F satisfies closure under σ iff for every consistent argumentation system AS and
for every set C of F -conclusions of AS under σ , we haveClRs(C) =C.
• F satisfies direct consistency under σ iff for every consistent argumentation
system AS and every set C of F -conclusions of AS under σ , there is no φ such
that φ ,¬φ ∈C.
• F satisfies indirect consistency under σ iff for every consistent argumentation
system AS and every set C of F -conclusions of AS under σ , there is no φ such
that φ ,¬φ ∈ClRs(C).
Caminada et al. [4] showed that ASPIC− satisfies these three postulates under the
grounded semantics, whereas Caminada and Wu [5] showed that closure and indirect
consistency are violated by ASPIC− under the preferred semantics.
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3 Abstract Argumentation with Deductive Joint Support
Multiple ways of augmenting argumentation frameworkswith a support relation between
arguments have been considered in the literature [6, 13, 14], giving rise to a lively
research field called bipolar argumentation. One of the ways of formally interpreting
the support relation is called deductive support [6]. Here the idea is that when an
argument a deductively supports an argument b, this is similar to the situation when a
formula φ logically entails a formula ψ , i.e. if one accepts a, one should also accept b.
In this section we extend the deductive support relation to a deductive joint support
relation, in whichmultiple arguments together can deductively support another argument.
Again the intuitive idea is similar to when multiple formulas entail another formula:
When a1, . . . ,an jointly deductively support b, this means that if a1, . . . ,an are all
accepted, b should also be accepted. In this section we introduce the notion of a
Joint Support Bipolar Argumentation Framework (JSBAF) in which such joint support
relations appear alongside the usual attack relation. We then show how the flattening
methodology (see [1]) can be used to adapt standard argumentation semantics to semantics
for JSBAFs that give a deductive interpretation to the joint support relation.
Definition 3.1. A Joint Support Bipolar Argumentation Framework (JSBAF) is a triple
(Ar,→,⇒) such that Ar is the set of all arguments in the framework, →⊆ Ar×Ar is
an attack relation and⇒⊆ 2Ar×Ar is a deductive joint support relation.
Example 3.2. As an example, we illustrate below a JSBAF J1 in which arguments a
and b jointly support c which is attacked by argument d:
c
a
b
d
Now that we have formally defined a JSBAF, let us move on to its semantics. The
principle idea is the same as in argumentation frameworks.
Definition 3.3. A JSBAF Semantics is a function that maps every JSBAF (Ar,→,⇒)
to a subset of 2Ar. Given a JSBAF semantics σ , we call the sets of arguments in
σ((Ar,→,⇒)), σ -extensions.
The deductive property of the joint support relation inspires the following notion of
a deductive JSBAF semantics:
Definition 3.4. A JSBAF semantics σ is called deductive iff for every JSBAF J =
(Ar,→,⇒), for every σ -extension E of J, every set S⊆ E and every A ∈ Ar such that
S⇒ A, we have A ∈ E .
Furthermore, we will require the notion of a conflict-free JSBAF semantics:
Definition 3.5. A JSBAF semantics σ is called conflict-free iff for every JSBAF J =
(Ar,→,⇒), for every σ -extension E and any a,b ∈ E , (a,b) /∈→.
We will flatten JSBAFs to standard AFs in a two-step process. In the first step,
we flatten JSBAFs to higher-level argumentation frameworks (originally introduced
by Gabbay [11]) that contain joint attacks.
Definition 3.6. We define a higher-level argumentation framework (higher level AF)
as a tuple (Ar,→) where Ar is the set of arguments in the framework and →⊆ (2Ar \
{ /0})×Ar is a joint attack relation.
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Example 3.7. The following is an example of a higher-level AF, where arguments a
and b jointly attack c:
c
b
a
Finally, we come to the two-step process of flattening a JSBAF into a standard AF.
The first step involves transforming the JSBAF to a higher-level AF by converting joint
supports to joint attacks while introducing some meta-arguments. The second step
involves transforming the higher-level AF to a standard AF by converting joint attacks
to regular one-on-one attacks.
Definition 3.8. Let J = (Ar,→,⇒) be a JSBAF. The one-step flattening of J, denoted
by flat1(J), is a higher-level AF (MS,→1), whereMS := Ar∪{b¯ | (X ,b) ∈⇒} and the
joint attack relation→1 is defined as follows:
• For each (X ,b) ∈⇒, we have b→1 b¯.
• For each X with (X ,b) ∈⇒ and for every a ∈ X , we have (X \ {a})∪{b¯}→1 a.
In what follows, we present three examples of this flattening:
Example 3.9. On the left, Figure 1 depicts a JSBAF J2 consisting of an argument a
supporting another argument b. On the right, Figure 1 depicts its one-step flattening
flat1(J2).
ba b¯ ba
Figure 1: JSBAF J2 and its one-step flattening flat1(J2)
Example 3.10. As a second example we reconsider the JSBAF J1 from Example 3.2.
The following is its one-step flattening flat1(J1):
a
b
c¯ c d
Example 3.11. As a last example, we illustrate a JSBAF J3 where arguments {a, b, c}
jointly support d (on the left) as well as its one-step flattening flat(J3) (on the right):
db
a
c
a
b
c
d¯ d
In the next step, we define how a higher-level AF can be flattened to a standard AF.
This flattening is originally due to Gabbay [11].
Definition 3.12. Let H = (Ar,→) be a higher-level AF. The flattening of H, denoted
by flat2(H), is a standard argumentation framework (MS,→2), where the set MS of
meta-arguments and the attack relation→2 are defined as follows:
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• MA=Ar∪{a¯ | there exists an attack (X ,b)∈→with a∈X and |X |> 1}∪{e(X) |
there exists an attack (X ,b) ∈→ with |X |> 1}.
• For all a ∈ Ar, we have a→2 a¯.
• For all ({a},b) ∈→, a→2 b.
• For all (X ,b) ∈→ where |X |> 1, e(X)→2 b, and a¯→2 e(X), a→2 a¯ for every
a ∈ X .
Example 3.13. The following figure depicts the flattening flat2(flat1(J1)) of the higher-level
AF flat1(J1) depicted in Example 3.10. This example also illustrates how to combine
the flattenings flat1 and flat2 in order to flatten a JSBAF a standard AF in two flattening
steps.
a¯ a
bb¯
¯¯c c¯ c de(b, c¯)
e(a, c¯)
Figure 3: The flattening flat2(flat1(J1)) of the higher-level AF flat1(J1) depicted in
Example 3.10
During the two-step process of flattening a JSBAF framework to an abstract argumentation
framework, meta-arguments like the c¯ and the ¯¯cwere introduced. As shown in Figure 3,
¯¯c is attacked only by c¯which is in turn attacked only by c. So intuitively, if c is accepted
¯¯c should also be accepted. Similarly if argument c is rejected, ¯¯c should also be rejected.
As a result both c¯ and ¯¯c can be omitted, thus simplifying the flattened framework.
This inspires a succint definition for the flattening of a JSBAF framework directly to
a simplified abstract framework in a single step instead of the two-step flattening that
has been demonstrated above.
Definition 3.14. Let J = (Ar,→,⇒) be a JSBAF. We write (MA′,→′) for flat1(flat1(J)).
Then the simplified flattening of J, denoted by flat(J), is a standard argumentation
framework (MA∗,→∗) defined as follows:
• MA∗ :=MA′ \ {a¯, ¯¯a | there is some (S,a) ∈⇒ with |S|> 1}
• →∗:= {(a,b) ∈MA∗×MA∗ | a→′ b}∪{(a,b)∈MA∗×MA∗ | ¯¯a→ b′}
Example 3.15. The following figure depicts the simplified flattening flat(J1) of the
JSBAF J1 from Example 3.2:
a¯ a
bb¯
c de(b,c)
e(a,c)
The flattening function flat allows us to define semantics of JSBAFs by first applying
the flattening function and then applying a standard argumentation semantics:
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Definition 3.16. For any Dung semantics σ , we define a JSBAF semantics sup(σ)
as follows: E is a sup(σ)-extension of (Ar,→1,⇒) iff there is an extension E
′ of
flat(Ar,→1,⇒) s.t. E = E
′∩Ar.
The following two lemmas establish useful facts about sup(σ):
Lemma 3.17. For any admissibility-based semanticsσ of Dung’s abstract frameworks,
sup(σ) is a deductive JSBAF semantics.
Proof. Let J = (Ar,→1,⇒) be a JSBAF and let E be a sup(σ)-extension of J. By
Definition 3.16, there is a σ -extension E ′ of flat(J) = (MA∗,→∗) such that E = E ′∩Ar.
Let S⊆ E and d ∈ Ar be such that S⇒ d. We need to show that d ∈ E . We distinguish
two cases:
Case 1: |S|= 1, say S= {a}. In this case, in flat(J), S⇒ d is flattened to the attacks
d→∗ d¯ and d¯→∗ a. Since a ∈ E ′ and E ′ is admissible, E ′ defends a, i.e. E ′ attacks d¯.
But d is the only attacker of d¯ in flat(J), so d ∈ E ′, i.e. d ∈ E .
Case 2: |S|> 1. In this case, in flat(J), S⇒ d is flattened into the following attacks for
each element a in S:
• a→∗ a¯
• for each b ∈ S \ {a}: b¯→∗ e({d}∪ (S \ {a}))
• e({d}∪ (S \ {a}))→∗ a
• d→∗ e({d}∪ (S \ {a}))
Let a ∈ S. Then a ∈ E ′, i.e. E ′ defends a. Since e({d} ∪ (S \ {a})) →∗ a, so E ′
attacks e({d} ∪ (S \ {a})). However, for each element b in (S \ {a}), b ∈ E ′, so
by the conflict-freeness of E ′, b¯ /∈ E ′. So the only element of E ′ that can attack
e({d}∪ (S \ {a})) is d. So d ∈ E ′, i.e. d ∈ E .
Lemma 3.18. For any admissibility-based semanticsσ of Dung’s abstract frameworks,
sup(σ) is a conflict-free JSBAF semantics.
Proof. Let J = (Ar,→1,⇒) be a JSBAF and let E be a sup(σ)-extension of J. By
Definition 3.16, there is a σ -extension E ′ of flat(J) such that E = E ′ ∩ Ar. E is
conflict-free because E = E ′∩Ar and E ′ is conflict-free.
Example 3.19. By Lemmas 3.17 and 3.18, sup(complete), sup(stable), sup(grounded)
and sup(preferred) are deductive, conflict-free JSBAF semantics.
4 Deductive ASPIC− and the Rationality Postulates
In this section we show how the joint deductive support relation can be applied to
structured argumentation in order to satisfy the three rationality postulates (closure,
direct and indirect consistency) in the context of unrestricted rebuttal. For this purpose,
we define Deductive ASPIC− (abbreviated as DA−), show that it satisfies these three
postulates and illustrate the result with an example.
In Deductive ASPIC−, arguments and attacks are defined in the same way as in
ASPIC−, but we also define a deductive joint support relation between arguments:
Definition 4.1. Let AS be an argumentation system. The JSBAF corresponding to AS
according to Deductive ASPIC−, denoted by JDA−(AS), is the JSBAF (Ar,→
′,⇒′),
where Ar is the set of arguments on the basis of AS, A→′ B holds iff A undercuts or
unrestrictedly rebuts B, and S⇒′ A holds iff A is of the form S→ ϕ for some formula
ϕ .
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Definition 4.2. Let AS = (Rs,Rd ,n) be an argumentation system and let σ be a JSBAF
semantics. For every σ -extension E of JDA−(AS), the set {Conc(A) | A ∈ E} is called
a set of DA− conclusions of AS under σ .
We now show that Deductive ASPIC− satisfies closure, direct consistency and
indirect consistency under any dedutive, conflict-free JSBAF semantics.
Lemma 4.3. Let σ be a deductive, conflict-free JSBAF semantics. Then Deductive
ASPIC− satisfies closure under σ .
Proof. Let AS = (Rs,Rd ,n) be an argumentation system and let C be a set of DA−
conclusions of AS under σ . Let S→ ϕ be a strict rule in Rs with S ⊆ C. We need
to show that ϕ ∈ C. By Definition 4.2, there is a σ -extension E of JDA−(AS) =
(Ar,→′,⇒′) such that C = {Conc(A) | A ∈ E}. Since S ⊆ C, there is a set F ⊆ E
such that S = {Conc(A) | A ∈ F}. Then F → ϕ is an argument on the basis of AS.
By Definition 4.1, F ⇒′ (F → ϕ). Since E is a σ -extension for a deductive JSBAF
semanticsσ , F ⊆E and F⇒′ (F → ϕ) imply that (F → ϕ) ∈ E . So ϕ =Conc(F → ϕ)∈
{Conc(A) | A ∈ E}=C.
Lemma 4.4. Let σ be a deductive, conflict-free JSBAF semantics. Then Deductive
ASPIC− satisfies direct consistency under σ .
Proof. Let AS = (Rs,Rd ,n) be a consistent argumentation system and let C be a set
of DA− conclusions of AS under σ . Suppose for a contradiction that ϕ ,¬ϕ ∈C. By
Definition 4.2, there is a σ -extension E of JDA−(AS) = (Ar,→
′,⇒′) such that C =
{Conc(A) |A∈E}. Then there areF,F ′ ∈ E such thatConcs(F) = φ andConcs(F ′) = ¬φ .
By the consistency of AS, F and F ′ cannot both be strict. Without loss of generality,
assumeF ′ is not strict. ThenF unrestrictedly rebutsF ′, which contradicts the conflict-freeness
of E .
Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 together imply the following lemma about indirect consistency:
Lemma 4.5. Let σ be a deductive, conflict-free JSBAF semantics. Then Deductive
ASPIC− satisfies indirect consistency under σ .
These three lemmas together with Lemmas 3.17 and 3.18 imply the following
theorem:
Theorem 4.6. Let σ be an admissibility-based argumentation semantics. Then Deductive
ASPIC− satisfies closure, direct consistency and indirect consistency under sup(σ).
We now illustrate the functioning of Deductive ASPIC− on an example, which
is based on the example that Caminada [2] used to show that closure is not satisfied
under preferred semantics in ASPIC−. We show how the same example interpreted in
Deductive ASPIC− does satisfy closure.
Example 4.7. Suppose Harry, Sally and Tom want to go on a bicycle ride with a
tandem. Since the tandem only has two seats, only two of the three can ride it at a
time. To formalize this scenario, we use the language L= {hw,sw, tw,ht,st, tt}, where
hw means “Harry wants to ride the tandem”, ht means “Harry will ride the tandem”,
and analogously for Sally (sw, st) and Tom (tw, tt). The scenario can be represented by
an argumentation system AS= {Rs,Rd}, where Rs = {→ hw;→ sw;→ tw;ht,st→¬tt;
st, tt→¬ht;tt,ht→¬st} and Rd = {hw⇒ ht;sw⇒ st;tw⇒ tt}. Intuitively, the strict
rules→ hw,→ sw, and→ tw represent that all three of themwant to ride on the tandem,
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the strict rules ht,st →¬tt, st, tt →¬ht and tt,ht →¬st represent that the tandem can
only seat two people, and the defeasible rules hw⇒ ht, sw⇒ st and tw⇒ tt represent
that as far as possible each person gets to do what they want to do.
The following arguments on the basis of AS can be constructed:
• A1 :→ hw
• A2 :→ sw
• A3 :→ tw
• A4 : A1 ⇒ ht
• A5 : A2 ⇒ st
• A6 : A3 ⇒ tt
• A7 : A5,A6 →¬ht
• A8 : A6,A4 →¬st
• A9 : A4,A5 →¬tt
The JSBAF JDA−(AS) is depicted in Figure 4. Its flattening flat(JDA−(AS)) is
depicted in Figure 5. The preferred extensions of flat(JDA−(AS)) are as follows:
• E1′ = {A1,A2,A3,A9, A¯6,A4,A5,e(A5,A7),e(A4,A8)}
• E2′ = {A1,A2,A3,A8, A¯5,A4,A6,e(A6,A7),e(A4,A9)}
• E3′ = {A1,A2,A3,A7, A¯4,A6,A5,e(A6,A8),e(A5,A9)}
Given the complexity of flat(JDA−(AS)), we provide a proof below that these three
extensions are the only preferred extensions of flat(JDA−(AS)) (Proposition 4.8).
From this it follows that the sup(preferred)-extensions of JDA−(AS) are {A1,A2,
A3,A9,A4,A5}, {A1,A2,A3,A8,A4,A6} and {A1,A2,A3,A7,A6,A5}. Therefore the sets
of DA− conclusions under the sup(preferred)-semantics are {hw,sw, tw,¬tt,ht,st},
{hw,sw, tw,¬st,ht, tt} and {hw,sw, tw,¬ht, tt,st}. The reader can easily verify that
each set of DA− conclusions under preferred semantics is closed under the set of strict
rules Rs, in line with the closure postulate.
A1 A2
A3
A4
A5A6
A7
A8A9
Figure 4: The JSBAF JDA−(AS)
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A¯4
A7
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A1 A2
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Figure 5: Flattening flat(JDA−(AS)) of the JSBAF JDA−(AS)
Proposition 4.8. The preferred extensions of flat(JDA−(AS)) are precisely E1,E2
and E3.
Proof. It is easy to see that each of E1, E2 and E3 attacks every argument outside the
extension, so each of them is a stable extension and thus also a preferred extension.
Let us suppose there exists an extension E of Flat(AFtandem) such that E 6= E1,
E 6= E2 and E 6= E3. Straightaway we see that E 6= /0 because a preferred extension is
a subset-maximal set. Therefore, E must contain atleast an element a.
We have structured the rest of the proof with case-wise distinctions for the different
possible values of a. Since every preferred extension is an admissible set, we use the
notion of admissibility henceforth.
Case 1: a= A9 or a= A8 or a= A7. Without loss of generality we assume that a= A9.
So, A9 ∈ E . Then A7 /∈ E and A8 /∈ E since E is conflict-free. Following the same line
of reasoning, A6 /∈ E , e(A5,A9) /∈ E and e(A4,A9) /∈ E . A¯6 ∈ E since it is defended
by A9. Thus, e(A6,A8) /∈ E and e(A6,A7) /∈ E . A4 ∈ E and A5 ∈ E since they are
defended by A9. This implies, A¯4 /∈ E and A¯5 /∈ E because E is conflict-free. Lastly,
e(A5,A7) ∈ E and e(A4,A8) ∈ E as they are both defended by E . We arrive at E = E1.
Similarly, assuming a= A8 leads us to E = E2 and a= A7 to E = E3. Contradiction.
Case 2: Case 1 does not hold and either a= A6 or a= A5 or a= A4. Without loss of
generality, let us assume a= A6 and so A6 ∈ E . Then A¯6 /∈ E , e(A5,A7) /∈ E , e(A4,A8) /∈ E
since E is conflict-free. This also implies A¯5 ∈ E as it is needed to defend A6 from the
attack of e(A5,A7) and A¯4 ∈ E as it is needed to defend A6 from e(A4,A8). Now since
A¯5 ∈ E , so, e(A5,A9) /∈ E. Then, e(A6,A8) ∈ E since it is needed to defend A¯4 from
the attack of A4. This implies A5 ∈ E as it defends e(A6,A8) from A8. Since E is
conflict-free so A¯5 /∈ E . Contradiction. A similar kind of reasoning can be applied
when a= A5 or a= A4.
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Case 3: Case 1 and 2 do not hold and either a= A¯6 or a= A¯4 or a= A¯5. Without loss of
generality, let us assume a= A¯6 and so A¯6 ∈ E . Then, e(A5,A7) ∈ E or e(A4,A8) ∈ E
in order to defend A¯6 from A6. Without loss of generality let us assume e(A5,A7) ∈ E .
So A5 ∈ E since it is needed to defend e(A5,A7) from A¯5. However, in this case we
have assumed that Case 2 does not hold. Contradiction. A similar kind of reasoning
can be applied when a= A¯4 or a= A¯5.
Case 4: Cases 1 and 2 and 3 do not hold. Then a must be an argument of the form
e(b,c). Without loss of generality, let us assume a= e(A5,A7) and so, e(A5,A7) ∈ E .
This means that A5 ∈ E since it is needed to defend e(A5,A7) from the attack of A¯5.
Contradiction.
In each of the four cases we have derived a contradiction. So our original assumption
must be false. In other words, E must be equal to either E1 or E2 or E3.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Caminada [2] has established that ASPIC+, which uses restricted rebuttal, satisfies the
three rationality postulates defined in Section 2 under any of the standard admissibility-
based semantics, whereas ASPIC−, which uses unrestricted rebuttal, satisfied closure
and indirect consistency only under the grounded semantics. In this paper we defined
a modification of ASPIC− called Deductive ASPIC−, which also uses unrestricted
rebuttal, but which satisfies all three rationality postulates under any admissibility-based
semantics. This is attained by keeping track not only of the attack relation between
arguments, but also of the deductive joint support relation between arguments linked
by an application of a strict rule.
The methodology introduced in this paper opens up multiple avenues for future
research. First, the results presented in this paper have been limited to structured
argumentation without preferences, so future work should study how these results
could be generalized to a variant of Deductive ASPIC− with preferences.
Furthermore, while the results presented in this paper are limited to admissibility-
based semantics, the general methodology is also applicable to naive-based semantics
like CF2, SCF2, stage and stage2. So far, the application of these semantics to structured
argumentation was limited by the fact that the closure postulate is violated under these
semantics, even when restricted rebuttal is used. Given that empirical cognitive studies
have found CF2 and SCF2 to be good models of human argument evaluation (see
[7, 8, 9]), it seems to us to be a very worthwhile endeavor to attempt to remedy this
situation. However, the approach of using the sup operator, i.e. to use JSBAF semantics
like sup(CF2) or sup(SCF2), will not yield to satisfaction of the closure postulate.
Instead, one can adapt these naive-based argumentation semantics to JSBAF semantics
in a different way. For example, a JSBAF variant of CF2 could be defined by ensuring
the deductiveness property on the level of each SCC. Additionally, the definition of
SCC would have to be adapted to account for the effect of joint deductive support (the
paths required in the definition of SCCs should be able to pass thorough the support
relation as well, however in the backward direction). This way the closure postulate
can be made to be satisfied in combination with these naive-based semantics.
Another avenue for future research is to apply the methodology introduced in
this paper to tackle the rationality postulates of non-interference and crash resistance
(see [2]). Wu and Podlaszewski [16] have introduced an approach to satisfying these
postulates by deleting inconsistent arguments, but when preferences are taken into
account, this approach fails to satisfy closure. Combining their approach with ours
REFERENCES
yields a framework in which closure as well as non-interference and crash resistance
can be satisfied in the presence of preferences.
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